[Review] Daniel Gräber - Nuclear Phase-Out Files - The Files

Siehe auch:
[Rezension] Daniel Gräber - Akte Atomausstieg - Die Akten

The 2025 book "Nuclear Phase-Out Files - The End of Nuclear Power and the Failure of the Energy Transition" is authored by journalist and writer Daniel Gräber. Gräber is a journalist specializing in investigative reporting who previously caused a stir between 2017 and 2019 with his publications exposing corruption within the Workers Welfare Association (Arbeiterwohlfahrt/AWO) in Frankfurt am Main. See also: [Domestic Policy] #Arbeiterwohlfahrt #AWO - How a Welfare Association in Frankfurt was looted
In 2024 Gräber once again caused a stir with his revelations when internal files from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs under Robert Habeck (Greens) were released following a successful legal challenge. The book "Nuclear Phase-Out Files" thus serves as a continuation and expansion of his previous reporting. In 2025 Gräber moved from the magazine Cicero to Apollo News. [2] [3] [4]

In his book Gräber focuses primarily on the revelations contained in documents obtained through litigation. As a result of the 2022 energy crisis a window of opportunity reportedly opened up in the political sphere that could have enabled a significant extension of reactor operating lifetimes or even a reversal of the nuclear phase-out. However Gräber accuses those responsible of having prioritized their own political interests over Germany’s national security and economic interests. Specifically he details how a key assessment was not conducted with an open mind and how a regulatory authority failed to act in a neutral manner.

The Nuclear Power Taboo

In 2022 the Federal Government could still have saved six nuclear power plants. At that time three nuclear power plants were still operational. And three nuclear power plants could still have been reactivated. However the operating lives of only three reactors were extended. When the last nuclear power plants in Germany went offline 60% of the population and even 18% of Green Party voters were opposed to the nuclear phase-out. According to Gräber this demonstrates that German politics in this instance was driven by ideology rather than by sober considerations. [1, p.10-13]

According to Gräber the taboo surrounding nuclear power began to waver in 2022. In late February 2022 Federal Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Habeck (Greens) even publicly announced that he would review the nuclear phase-out with an open mind. However the files obtained through legal action reveal a different sequence of events. [1, p.43-50]

Lieber Volker, wir benötigen einen Hausvermerk, der des Ergebnis der Prüfung der Frage 'Kann eine AKW-Laufzeitverlängerung in der derzeitigen Situation helfen, die Energiesicherheit zu erhöhen' verschriftlicht und mit dem wir sowohl intern als auch öffentlich arbeiten können. Der Minister hat ja gestern öffentlich angekündigt, dass es geprüft wird. Könnt ihr das zügig auf den Weg bringen? (Falls es das nicht schon gibt. )
Herzlichen Dank. Viele Grüße! Robert Heinrich, LA

Dear Volker, we require an internal memo documenting the results of the assessment regarding the question: "Can extending the operating life of nuclear power plants help enhance energy security in the current situation?" We need a document that we can utilize for both internal and public purposes. As you know the Minister publicly announced yesterday that this matter is being reviewed. Could you get this process underway promptly? (Assuming such a document does not already exist. )
Many thanks. Best regards! Robert Heinrich, LA [1, p.44]
Lieber Volker, das Ministerbüro und ST Gr [Staatssekretär Graichen] bittet Euch, den Vermerk zur Kernenergie in die Hand zu nehmen. Das BMUV [Bundesministerium für Umwelt und Verbraucherschutz] schreibt etwas auf, was wir dann integrieren müssten. Kern unseres Vermerks muss eine energiewirtschaftliche und -politische Bewertung des Weiterlaufens der AKW sein. Patrick bittet insbesondere darum, darzustellen, wie wir auch ohne die drei in Rede stehenden Atomkraftwerke die Versorgungssicherheit sichern können.
...

Dear Volker, The Minister’s Office and ST Gr [State Secretary Graichen] request that you take charge of the memo regarding nuclear energy. The BMUV [Federal Ministry for the Environment and Consumer Protection] is drafting a text that we would then need to integrate. The core of our memo must be an energy-economic and energy-policy assessment of the continued operation of the nuclear power plants. Patrick specifically requests that you outline how we can ensure security of supply even without the three nuclear power plants in question.
... [1, p.45]

Gräber reiterates that this approach was in fact not open and that the continued operation of the nuclear power plants was prevented for political reasons. Consequently the outcome was merely a three-month extension of their operating lifetimes. Instead the nuclear power plants could have continued to operate. In that scenario lower-cost nuclear plants could have displaced more expensive power plants forcing them to shut down. This would have lowered electricity prices as the most expensive power plant currently in operation always determines the market price (merit-order-principle). [1, p.43-50]

Die Strompreise würden sinken. Zum einen, weil die Abschaltung der Kernkraftwerke im Süden dazu führen würde, dass Netzbetreiber öfter stabilisierend eingreifen müssten, wodurch die Kosten steigen. Genau das ist seit der AKW-Abschaltung im April 2023 geschehen. Zum anderen, weil sie finanziell längst abgeschriebenen Kernkraftwerke nicht nur zuverlässig, sondern auch günstig Strom produzieren. Und da an der Strombörse das teuerste noch benötige Kraftwerk den Preis für alle setzt, hilft jedes Kernkraftwerk, das teuere Gaskraftwerke aus dem Marktgeschehen hinausdrängt.

Electricity prices would fall. For one thing because the shutdown of nuclear power plants in the south would necessitate more frequent stabilizing interventions by grid operators—thereby driving up costs. And this is precisely what has happened since the nuclear plant shutdown in April 2023. For another because nuclear power plants hich have long since been fully depreciated produce electricity not only reliably but also cheaply. And since on the electricity exchange the most expensive power plant still required to meet demand sets the price for all every nuclear power plant that displaces expensive gas-fired power plants from the market helps to lower costs. [1, p.48]

However this was not the case beforehand either. Apart from nuclear power no different types of power plants were in operation in Germany prior to the nuclear phase-out than were after the nuclear phase-out. And as a result of the merit-order-principle the most expensive power plants that is the very same ones determined the electricity price both before and after the transition. The nuclear phase-out did however increase the demand for energy imports and likely their price as well. The nuclear phase-out likely had a greater impact on gas prices and consequently on heating costs than it did on electricity prices.

The (Non-)Open Review

The Reactor Safety Commission (Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission/RSK) is an institution within the Federal Ministry for the Environment tasked with providing advice on reactor safety and the disposal of radioactive waste. The RSK is composed of scientists, expert assessors and representatives of the plant operators and its members are appointed by the Federal Ministry for the Environment. However Gräber describes how the RSK was contrary to proper procedure not consulted as it should have been when the phase-out of nuclear power was being reviewed in an open-ended manner starting in February 2022. Particularly noteworthy is the correspondence between Patrick Graichen the then State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Stefan Tidow the then State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for the Environment as well as the departments under their respective authority. Instead Graichen implicitly urged Tidow to bypass the RSK regarding the nuclear phase-out. [1, p.76-84]

Lieber Stefan, anbei, wie besprochen, die Anmerkungen der Betreiber zum Thema Laufzeitverlängerung. Es steht zwar kein Fazit darunter, aber im Grunde ist klar: Sie wollen das nicht. So was bräuchte es letzten Endes auch von der Atomaufsicht. Und dann ist die Frage, wer das mal auf welchen offiziellen Briefkopf packt.
Besten Gruß
Patrick

Dear Stefan, attached as discussed are the operators' comments regarding the extension of the operating period. Although there is no formal conclusion included the bottom line is clear: They do not want this. Ultimately such a move would also require approval from the nuclear regulatory authority. And that raises the question of who will eventually put this in writing—and on whose official letterhead.
Best regards
Patrick [1, p.77]

On March 1, 2022 the Head of Department S ("Nuclear Safety, Radiation Protection") at the Federal Ministry for the Environment Gerrit Niehaus briefed several division heads on the assignment. And on March 3, 2022 Niehaus reported back to Graichen regarding what he had originally requested. [1, p.76-84]

Liebe Kollegen, ich habe von St [Staatssekretär] den Auftrag erhalten, für das BMWK einen 'Prüfvermerk' zur Möglichkeit von Laufzeitverlängerungen erhalten [gemeint war wohl: zu erstellen]. Ich habe noch keine Antwort auf meine Nachfragen bekommen, ob wir weitere Erkenntnisquellen (GRS, RSK, Länder) nutzen und bis wann wir liefern sollen.
Mit freundlichen Gruß
Gerrit Niehaus

Dear Colleagues, I have received instructions from the State Secretary to prepare a "review memorandum" for the BMWK regarding the feasibility of extending operating lifetimes. I have not yet received a response to my inquiries as to whether we should consult additional sources of expertise (GRS, RSK, the federal states) and by when we are expected to deliver.
Best regards
Gerrit Niehaus [1, p.79]
Die Abteilung S (Nukleare Sicherheit, Strahlenschutz) kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Verlängerung der Laufzeit der drei noch planerisch zugrunde gelegten 31.12.2022 hinaus sicherheitstechnisch nicht vertretbar ist.
...
Eine Laufzeitverlängerung ist aus Gründen der nuklearen Sicherheit abzulehnen.

Division S (Nuclear Safety, Radiation Protection) concludes that extending the operating lifetime of the three remaining plants beyond December 31, 2022 the date currently assumed for planning purposes is not justifiable from a safety perspective.
...
An extension of the operating lifetime must be rejected on grounds of nuclear safety. [1, p.81] [7, p.16 , p.66]

In the interim specifically on March 2, 2022 a confidential offer from the energy provider EnBW based in Baden-Württemberg was received by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. The offer included the continued operation of a total of three nuclear power plants belonging to EnBW and two other energy providers. In total this offer represented a base load capacity of 4,300 MW. Graichen immediately forwarded the offer from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs to Tidow at the Federal Ministry for the Environment. However the Federal Ministry for the Environment—represented by Niehaus rejected the offer. [1, p.84-94]

...
In dem Dokument der EnBW sind keine zusätzlichen Argumente enthalten, die aus technischer Sicht zur Aufrechterhaltung des nuklearen Sicherheit in den Vermerk gehören. Beide Dokumente beschreiben sie Möglichkeit eigene Laufzeitverlängerung stützende Kernkraftwerke nach aktuellem Kenntnisstand.

...
The EnBW document contains no additional arguments that, from a technical perspective, belong in the memorandum regarding the maintenance of nuclear safety. Both documents describe—based on the current state of knowledge the potential for nuclear power plants to support their own continued operation. [1, p.86]

The (Non-)Neutral Authority

The Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways or in short the Federal Network Agency is a federal supreme authority within the portfolio of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. The responsibilities of the Federal Network Agency include maintaining and promoting competition in the so-called network markets (markets for electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal services and railways). Another task of the Federal Network Agency is the facilitation of conciliation proceedings.

Prior to the nuclear phase-out the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs commissioned the four transmission system operators (TSOs) to calculate what lay in store for the European electricity market and power grid during the winter of 2022/23. The Federal Network Agency was also involved in this process. However a communication from Department Head Zerress who reports directly to the President of the Federal Network Agency Klaus Müller revealed an undisclosed process that was anything but open-ended. Instead the objective was to portray the nuclear phase-out as a risk of manageable proportions. [1, p.132-138]

Nur intern, nicht für die ÜNB: Als Ergebnis wäre allenfalls ein Streckbetrieb akzeptabel. Und auch das nur, wenn Bayern und andere politisch dafür etwas bezahlen. Die Ergebnisse sollten auch berücksichtigen, dass es verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken gibt, das Gesetz zum Atomausstieg noch mal zu ändern. Er darf also nicht der Weltuntergang prognostiziert werden, falls Karlsruhe entsprechend dazwischen gegen sollte.

Internal use only not for TSOs: At most the only acceptable outcome would be continued operation at reduced output. And even that would be acceptable only if Bavaria and other parties were willing to pay a political price for it. The findings should also take into account the constitutional concerns surrounding any further amendment to the nuclear phase-out legislation. Consequently the scenario in which Karlsruhe were to intervene must not be portrayed as a doomsday catastrophe. [1, p.134]

Ultimately the operating lives of the last three German nuclear power plants were extended by three and a half months. On April 15, 2023 the last German nuclear power plants were shut down.

Preview:

Src:
[1] Daniel Gräber - Akte Atomausstieg - Das Ende der Kernkraft und das Scheitern der Energiewende ISBN 978-3-451-07341-0
[2] Habecks Geheimakten: Wie die Grünen beim Atomausstieg getäuscht haben 2024-12-21
https://www.cicero.de/innenpolitik/meistgelesene-artikel-2024-april-habecks-geheimakten-wie-die-grunen-beim-atomausstieg-getauscht-haben
[3] Cicero: Daniel Gräber
https://www.cicero.de/autoren/daniel-gr%C3%A4ber
[4] Apollo News: Daniel Gräber
https://apollo-news.net/author/daniel-graeber/
[5] RWE Papier 2022-02-26
https://assets.cicero.de/2024-04/2022-02-26_RWEPapier.pdf
[6] Laufzeitverlängerung deutscher Atomkraftwerke - Mit der nuklearen Sicherheit verträgliche Szenarien 2022-03-01
https://assets.cicero.de/2024-04/2022-03-01_Atomaufsicht_Version1.pdf
[7] Laufzeitverlängerung deutscher Atomkraftwerke - Bwertung der Sicherheit 2022-03-03
https://assets.cicero.de/2024-04/2022-03-03_Atomaufsicht_Version2.pdf
[8] Laufzeitverlängerung von Atomkraftwerken bis 31.3.2023 2022-03-03
https://assets.cicero.de/2024-04/2022-03-03_BMWKFachreferat.pdf
[9] Entwurf: Prüfvermerk 2022-03-04
https://assets.cicero.de/2024-04/2022-03-04_EntwurfPruefvermerk.pdf
[10] FAQ 2022-03-05
https://assets.cicero.de/2024-04/2022-03-05_FAQHabeck.pdf
[11] Laufzeitverlängerung der Kernkraftwerke umgehend in die Wege leiten 2022-07-07
https://assets.cicero.de/2024-04/2022-07-07_AiwangerBrief.pdf

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