[Domestic Policy] Militarization of the AfD - Between Conscription and Transatlantic Lobbies

Siehe auch:
[Innenpolitik] Militarisierung der AfD - Zwischen Wehrpflicht und transatlantischen Lobbies

For many who desire a peaceful foreign policy and a rapprochement with Russia, the AfD is regarded as a de facto "peace party". The sharpest criticism leveled by the AfD and its base against military rearmament is that it endangers the very nation and population they seek to defend. This stance is being put to the test, particularly during the so-called "Zeitenwende" the era of military buildup in Germany and Europe. At the same time there are voices within the AfD and its orbit that actually advocate for this rearmament. The following section examines the voting behavior, actions, and statements of the party and its members in greater detail.

The AfD presents itself as a party of moderate yet self-confident foreign and defense policy. At the same time, the AfD portrays itself as a party that is neither militaristic nor in favor of the current military buildup. Accordingly, it is a party that pursues a realistic compromise between the current military buildup and pacifism.

Die Mitgliedschaft in der Nato entspricht den außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Interessen Deutschlands, soweit sich die Nato auf ihre Aufgabe als Verteidigungsbündnis beschränkt. Wir setzen uns dafür ein, den europäischen Teil der atlantischen Allianz deutlich zu stärken. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, ist es unabdingbar, die militärischen Fähigkeiten der deutschen Streitkräfte wiederherzustellen, um Anschluss an die strategischen und operativen Erfordernisse zu finden.
Grundsatzprogramm der AfD

NATO membership aligns with Germany’s foreign and security policy interests, provided that NATO limits itself to its role as a defensive alliance. We are committed to significantly strengthening the European component of the Atlantic Alliance. To achieve this goal, it is essential to restore the military capabilities of the German armed forces in order to meet strategic and operational requirements.
AfD Basic Program [1, p.30]

When it comes to the defense budget and the Bundeswehr’s equipment, the AfD is clearly of the view that the armed forces lacks sufficient resources. However it is not entirely clear whether the AfD is aiming for a renewal of existing equipment without specifying the details or for rearmament.

Die deutschen Streitkräfte sind derzeit nur noch bedingt einsatzbereit. Durch politische Fehlentscheidungen und grobes Missmanagement wurden sie über nahezu drei Dekaden hinweg vernachlässigt. Sie müssen in vollem Umfang wieder in die Lage versetzt werden, ihre Aufgaben wirkungsvoll und nachhaltig zu erfüllen. Dies ist die Voraussetzung dafür, dass Nato, EU und internationale Staatengemeinschaft Deutschland als gleichberechtigten Partner wahrnehmen.
Grundsatzprogramm der AfD

The German armed forces are currently only capable of operational deployment to a limited extent. They have been neglected for nearly three decades due to flawed political decisions and gross mismanagement. They must be fully enabled to carry out their tasks effectively and sustainably. This is a prerequisite for NATO, the EU, and the international community to view Germany as an equal partner.
AfD Basic Program [1, p.31]

The AfD clearly advocates for the reintroduction of compulsory military service. In this context, conscription is intended to foster a bond between the population, the armed forces, and the state, as well as to ensure sufficient recruitment for the active armed forces and the reserves.

Durch die Rückkehr zur Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht schaffen wir die Voraussetzungen dafür,

dass sich die Bevölkerung mit „ihren Soldaten” und „ihrer Bundeswehr” identifiziert, mit Streitkräften, die in der Bevölkerung fest verankert sind,

dass sich das Bewusstsein für die wehrhafte Demokratie wiederbelebt,

dass nachhaltig Nachwuchs aus allen Gesellschaftsschichten gewonnen wird und damit eine intelligentere Armee möglich wird,

dass ein breites Potential an Reservedienstleistenden entsteht.

Deshalb tritt die AfD dafür ein, für alle männlichen deutschen Staatsbürger im Alter zwischen 18 und 25 Jahren den Grundwehrdienst wieder einzusetzen.
Grundsatzprogramm der AfD

By returning to general conscription, we create the conditions for:

the population to identify with "its soldiers" and "its Bundeswehr" with armed forces firmly rooted in society,

a revival of the awareness of a democracy capable of defending itself,

the sustainable recruitment of personnel from all walks of life, thereby enabling a more intelligent army,

the creation of a broad pool of reservists.

Therefore, the AfD advocates reinstating basic military service for all male German citizens aged 18 to 25.
AfD Basic Program [1, p.32]

Conscription, Military Service, and One's Own Youth

Officially the AfD supports the reintroduction of military conscription which was suspended in 2011. In the party's view conscription is not merely a recruitment tool for the armed forces. For the AfD conscription is also a project aimed at socio political awakening.
However there is significant internal disagreement. In September 2025 a dispute over conscription arose within the AfD’s "Federal Expert Committee on Foreign and Security Policy". Rüdiger Lucassen (AfD) a retired colonel and the party's defense policy spokesperson at the time created a motion titled "Securing Germany's Defense Capability - Reactivating Conscription", which prompted a counter initiative in the form of a resolution titled "No Conscription for Foreign Wars". Consequently the vote on the initial motion was postponed.
This disagreement extends to the party leadership itself. The two party leaders hold differing views on the matter. While Tino Chrupalla (AfD) currently opposes the reintroduction of conscription Alice Weidel (AfD) supports it. Chrupalla (AfD) has notably recognized the apparent contradiction advocating for conscription does not necessarily entail having a say in how the armed forces are deployed. The AfD could vote in favor of conscription without actually being in a position to authorize or block Bundeswehr deployments or structural changes. [1, p.31] [2]

Wir sind für die Wehrpflicht, ganz grundsätzlich. Wir sind die einzige Partei, die für die Wehrpflicht ist.

We are in favor of conscription, as a matter of principle. We are the only party that supports conscription.

Bernd Baumann (AfD)
First Parliamentary Secretary of the Bundestag [4]

In October 2025 the AfD introduced a motion in the Bundestag to reverse the 2011 suspension of compulsory military service. This motion was adopted within the parliamentary group without any opposing votes but was ultimately not submitted to the Bundestag.
Then in December 2025 the introduction of the new military service was decided upon by the government. However the AfD voted against this military service. [3] [4] [5] [5, alt]

[6]

It is striking on the one hand that only the CDU/CSU electorate is more in favor of military conscription than that of the AfD. The support for conscription found in the AfD’s party platform is reflected in the views of its electorate. Furthermore support for conscription is virtually identical in East and West Germany. Consequently the AfD has less incentive to tailor its stance to the specific region where it achieves better election results. [6]

[6]

However support for conscription is not without conflict among the public as approval correlates positively with age, while opposition correlates negatively with it. This creates a conflict as those directly affected by conscription oppose it, whereas those who support it are not affected by it. Thus advocating for conscription risks losing the support of the younger demographic even if it does not jeopardize the backing of the majority of the population.
And while the AfD rhetorically champions civil liberties and self-determination, it inevitably advocates for the external control of the youth who would be subject to conscription. The ideal of a strong yet restrained state thus gives way to the surrender of its own electorate and the population at large to interests and power projection that the party ostensibly rejects. [6]

Rearmament, Special Fund, and "Zeitenwende"

It is widely considered undisputed that the German Bundeswehr has been hollowed out by budget cuts. However this statement could not be further from the truth. In fact the defense budget has been rising for about a decade albeit to varying degree. [7]

[7] [8]

At the same time the number of active-duty soldiers tends to be decreasing. Consequently the funds available per soldier have risen significantly over the past decade or so. Therefore if there are issues regarding the Bundeswehr's equipment existing expenditures should certainly be reviewed. [7] [8] [9, UVGD] [9, OVGD]

[7] [8] [9, UVGD] [9, OVGD]

Consequently the fact that defense spending has further accelerated since 2022 can be deemed ill-advised. As a result of this rapid rise in defense spending the increased demand for defense equipment is colliding with production capacities that have expanded at a slower pace. As Mannheim based economists Tom Krebs and Patrick Kaczmarczyk have observed, this inevitably leads to price increases and higher profits for the companies involved, but not to a significant rise in production. [10, p.22]

Der kurzfristige Fiskalmultiplikatir für Militärausgaben dürfte in Deutschland höchstens bei 0,5 liegen, mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit liegt er sogar weit darunter. Das bedeutet: Ein zusätzlicher Euro für militärische Ausgaben erzeugt bestenfalls 50 Cent zusätzliche gesamtwirtschaftliche Produktion, möglicherweise aber gar keinen. Damit ist die ökonomische Rendite der gegenwärtigen Rüstungsausgabenpolitik vergleichsweise gering. Investitionen in die öffentliche Infrastruktur oder soziale Dienstleistungen wie Kitas und Ganztagsschulen weisen dagegen Multiplikatoren zwischen 2 und 3 auf, also vier- bis sechsmal höhere Produktionseffekte pro eingesetztem Euro.

The short-term fiscal multiplier for military spending in Germany is likely no higher than 0.5; in all probability, it is actually far lower. This means: An additional euro spent on the military generates, at best, 50 cents of additional economic output and possibly none at all. Consequently, the economic return on current defense spending policy is comparatively low. In contrast, investments in public infrastructure or social services such as daycare centers and all day schools yield multipliers of between 2 and 3, representing an economic output effect four to six times greater for every euro spent. [10, p.22]

Furthermore the current government is cutting back on spending despite the existence of underutilized capacity in the rest of the economy. Instead of financing the increased defense spending through an overall rise in expenditure the government is making cuts elsewhere to cover these higher defense costs. In effect spending held constant in real terms is being shifted to sectors where this leads to price increases. [10, p.22]

Ein zentraler Grund für die geringe Effizienz militärischer Ausgaben in Deutschland ist die derzeitige Struktur des Rüstungssektors: Die Produktionskapazitäten sind bereits stark ausgelastet, während der Wettbewerb durch intransparente Vergabeverfahren eingeschränkt ist. In einer solchen Marktumgebung führen zusätzliche Staatsausgaben primär zu Preissteigerungen und höheren Gewinnen für die beteiligten Unternehmen, nicht aber zu einem signifikanten Anstieg der Produktion. Der spektakuläre Kursanstieg von Rüstungskonzernen wie Rheinmetall ist Ausdruck genau dieser Marktmechanismen. Die Reaktionen auf den Finanzmärkten implizieren, dass die Gewinne deutlich steigen müssen, damit der mehr als zwanzigfache Anstieg seit 2020 gerechtfertigt werden kann.

A key reason for the low efficiency of military spending in Germany is the current structure of the defense sector: Production capacities are already operating at high utilization rates, while competition is constrained by opaque procurement processes. In such a market environment, additional government spending primarily drives up prices and increases profits for the companies involved, rather than leading to a significant rise in output. The spectacular surge in the share prices of defense companies like Rheinmetall reflects precisely these market dynamics. Financial market reactions imply that profits must rise substantially to justify the more than twentyfold increase seen since 2020. [10, p.22]

The AfD's official position is that the Bundeswehr is inadequately equipped. At the same time the AfD opposes government debt. [1, p.31 , p.76]

Die AfD strebt die Rückkehr zu ausgeglichenen Staatshaushalten an. Sie befürwortet die schrittweise Rückführung der ausgeuferten öffentlichen Verschuldung.
Grundsatzprogramm der AfD

The AfD aims for a return to balanced government budgets. It advocates the gradual reduction of excessive public debt.
AfD Basic Program [1, p.76]

When the so-called "Zeitenwende" was announced in 2022 and the Bundestag voted on the 100 billion Euro special fund for the Bundeswehr, the AfD did not reject it. The AfD cast 33 votes in favor and 35 votes against it. Eight AfD MPs abstained. Thus with this vote roughly half of the MPs sacrificed their own party platform regarding rearmament. [11]
In 2025 following the federal election but before the new MPs took office the Bundestag amended the debt brake to facilitate future rearmament as well as to ease the debt burden of the federal states. In this instance unlike with the special fund the AfD voted unanimously against the measure. Only three AfD MPs abstained.
[12] [12, alt]

It is unclear whether the AfD rejected the second vote because it opposes the scale of debt incurred for rearmament or because that vote also enabled the federal states to take on more debt. What is clear however is that the AfD portrays itself as a defender of the "little guy" and the impoverished middle class.
Yet this claim is undermined by every instance of support for rearmament and rising defense spending. As defense spending grows particularly when it displaces other expenditures rather than being funded additionally the economy's finite resources are diverted toward sectors that are less productive and do not generate prosperity. In doing so the party abandons its criticism of bureaucracy and the size of the state, as well as its advocacy for economic freedom.

Support for and Opposition to Bundeswehr Deployments

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO faced questions regarding its very existence. The question arose as to whether NATO was still needed or could serve a new purpose (out of area or out of business). The AfD's official stance on this matter is that NATO should be "restricted to its role as a defensive alliance".
However this party line is barely discernible in the AfD's voting behavior. While the AfD's voting record on Bundeswehr deployments does not exactly align with that of the government there is currently no outright rejection of such deployments nor has there been one in the past. [1, p.30]

Mandat	Vergleich
UNIFIL ( United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon )	28.06.2019	25.06.2026
UNIFIL ( United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon )	87% No	78% Yes
KFOR ( Kosovo Force )	28.06.2019	11.06.2026
KFOR ( Kosovo Force )	85% No	91% No
EUFOR / ALTHEA ( European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina )	23.06.2023	11.06.2026
	67% No	90% No
UNMISS ( United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan )	23.06.2023	11.06.2026
	80% Yes	77% Yes
EU NAVFOR / Operation Atalanta ( European Union Naval Force )	23.06.2023	11.06.2026
	81% Yes	81% Yes
SEA GUARDIAN ( Maritime Surveillance and Counter-Terrorism in the Mediterranean Region )	23.06.2023	11.06.2026
	95% No	85% No

Comparison of AfD Voting Behavior Regarding Extended Bundeswehr Deployments [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24]

When evaluating this comparison it is important to note that the mandates are of different nature. The EU NAVFOR / Operation Atalanta and SEA GUARDIAN mandates are ones that can also affect the direct safety of German citizens. The AfD has given its approval to these in some instances. The KFOR and EUFOR / ALTHEA mandates concern countries close to Germany and consequently have some bearing on Germany's own security. The AfD has completely rejected them. And while the UNIFIL and UNMISS mandates stem from United Nations Security Council resolutions they do not directly affect Germany. In the case of these mandates AfD support has actually increased over time.

Isolation from Russia and NATO's eastward expansion

The AfD is frequently characterized as critical of NATO and pro-Russian. This is usually intended as a negative description or an accusation. And regardless of whether one views a critical stance toward NATO and a pro-Russian attitude positively or negatively this description may well have been accurate when the AfD was first established. However the party is increasingly moving away from these positions.

Following the escalation of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022 NATO expansion once again became a relevant issue and the two Scandinavian countries Finland and Sweden joined the alliance. Finland’s case is unique. For one thing Finland and Russia share a direct and very long border. Furthermore Finland’s accession to NATO marks the end of the country’s long standing and successful policy of non-alignment. The result is an expansion of NATO towards Russia even though Russia views this very alliance as an existential threat.
However the AfD did not oppose this development. On July 8, 2022 the AfD voted in favor of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. [25]

Rainer Rothfuß (AfD) is a known figure within Germany’s peace movement. He has been particularly active in traveling to Russia and meeting with representatives of the Russian government. Most recently in 2025 Rothfuß visited Sochi (Russia) where he met with former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (Jedinaja Rossija/United Russia). [26]
But in November party leader Weidel (AfD) cancelled a planned trip to Russia by Rothfuß. This marks a departure from past diplomatic efforts. However it aligns with the AfD's growing move away from any form of rapprochement with Russia. For instance party leader Chrupalla (AfD) has already faced internal criticism for questioning whether Russia poses a direct threat to Germany. Meanwhile Bundestag member and Defense Committee member Hannes Gnauck (AfD) has openly stated that Russia must be viewed as a threat to Germany. [27] [28]

Wir streben 2029 Regierungsverantwortung an und müssen die sicherheitspolitischen Realitäten anerkennen: Es gibt feindselige russische Aktivitäten in Europa, darunter Desinformation, Spionage, Sabotageversuche und hochgradig provokatives Verhalten im Ostseeraum. Dabei wurde auch die Sicherheit deutscher Soldaten gefährdet.

We aim to assume government responsibility in 2029 and must acknowledge the realities of security policy: There are hostile Russian activities in Europe, including disinformation, espionage, attempts at sabotage, and highly provocative behavior in the Baltic Sea region. In the process, the safety of German soldiers has also been jeopardized.

Hannes Gnauck (AfD) [28]

For many who desire a peaceful foreign policy and a rapprochement with Russia the AfD remains an attractive option. However key campaign promises are being abandoned in the interest of becoming fit for government and coalition partnerships. Yet by adopting the rhetoric of war the AfD is losing a defining characteristic that distinguished it from the established parties thereby becoming less of a genuine alternative.
In contrast to previous mixed developments this trend is far more clear cut. Here the AfD is definitively abandoning its origins and its commitment to anti-imperialism and peace, clearly transforming into an enforcer of the transatlantic alliance and the new confrontation between power blocs. On top of that the isolation of Russia makes the resumption of Russian energy supplies to Germany and thus lower energy costs for the country less likely.

Foreign and Defense Policy Spokesperson

Shifts in a party's direction do not stem solely from its platform rather they are largely the result of the actions taken by its members. In this regard Lucassen (AfD) the party's defense policy spokesperson at the time and Markus Frohnmaier (AfD) the foreign policy spokesperson particularly stood out.
For instance while serving as defense policy spokesperson Lucassen (AfD) advocated for massive military rearmament and a leadership role for Germany at the Munich Security Conference (MSC). In response to the new US defense strategy Lucassen (AfD) argued that Germany should step up as a leading European nation and shoulder the primary burden along NATO’s northeastern flank. Ironically at the very same time Rothfuß (AfD) was demonstrating against the Munich Security Conference (MSC) outside the event venue. [29] [30]

Mir schwebt beispielsweise die Übernahme der militärischen Hauptlast an der Nordostflanke der Nato vor. Zusätzlich sollte Deutschland eine starke maritime Unterstützung zur Sicherung im Nordatlantik bereitstellen können.

I envisage for example assuming the primary military burden on NATO’s northeastern flank. In addition Germany should be capable of providing strong maritime support to ensure security in the North Atlantic.
Rüdiger Lucassen (AfD) [29]

Lucassen’s (AfD) statements and ambitions evidently did not meet with universal approval within the party. The exact sequence of events is not known but Lucassen (AfD) resigned as defense policy spokesman in April 2026. In doing so Lucassen (AfD) preempted a motion of no confidence. [31]

Foreign policy spokesperson Frohnmaier (AfD) has faced no visible sanctions despite making similarly controversial statements. In December 2025 Frohnmaier (AfD) received the Allen-Welsh-Dulles Prize from the New York Young Republican Club. This prize is named after Allen Dulles (1893-1969) the former director of the CIA (1953-1961).
Following the abduction of Maduro (PSUV) by US forces German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) declared that "the legal classification of the US intervention is complex" instead of condemning or at least acknowledging this violation of international law. And Frohnmaier (AfD) stated that "it is currently too early for a final assessment of the US actions". Furthermore Frohnmaier (AfD) declared that "the election results in Venezuela are not internationally recognized, opposition parties are banned and excluded from elections" and that "the country is considered the central instigator of cocaine smuggling into Europe". Thus the AfD repeated the obviously fabricated pretexts of the US. [32] [33] [34] [35] [36]

However Frohnmaier has also made highly questionable statements regarding the attacks by Israel and the USA on Iran. For instance he failed to identify a clear violation of international law in either the initial attack in 2025 or the outbreak of war in 2026. Yet if one cannot recognize a violation of international law in an unprovoked attack on another country this indicates either a vast lack of education or double standards. [37] [38]

Ich unterstütze keine Angriffe, sondern noch mal: Wir unterstützen, dass es so schnell wie möglich dazu kommt, dass jetzt Gespräche stattfinden und diese Auseinandersetzung beendet werden kann.
...
Ich glaube, da muss man schon differenzieren und kann nicht einfach sagen, ich bin da dafür oder dagegen. Im Moment ist es so, dass Israel agiert, und wir haben hier, wenn wir das Völkerrecht betrachten, den Knackpunkt, dass die Frage beantwortet werden muss: Ist es ein Verstoß gegen das Gewaltverbot, ja oder nein.

I do not support attacks rather to reiterate we support the earliest possible commencement of talks so that this conflict can be brought to an end.
...
I believe one has to make distinctions here one cannot simply say "I am for it" or "I am against it". At the moment Israel is taking action and viewing the situation through the lens of international law we face a crucial issue that requires an answer: Does this constitute a violation of the prohibition on the use of force yes or no.
Markus Frohmaier (AfD)
Foreign Policy Spokesperson [37]

Speziell zum Iran: Die völkerrechtliche Einordnung ist tatsächlich schwierig und keineswegs eindeutig.

Regarding Iran specifically: Its classification under international law is indeed difficult and by no means clear cut.
Markus Frohmaier (AfD)
Foreign Policy Spokesperson [38]

It is not immediately obvious why Lucassen (AfD) was effectively forced to resign while Frohnmaier (AfD) was not. However just as with the policy of isolating Russia and the support for NATO’s eastward expansion this trend is unmistakable.
In this regard the AfD has abandoned its origins and its commitment to upholding international law and pursuing a peaceful foreign policy. Instead of criticizing or even changing the prevailing political course the AfD is participating in militarization and a hostile foreign policy.

Conclusion

Regarding issues such as military conscription, rearmament, and Bundeswehr deployments, the AfD positions itself somewhere between a critique of the status quo and the prevailing transatlantic consensus. While the party often presents itself outwardly as a champion of peace and national sovereignty, a look at its internal dynamics reveals a profound contradiction.
On the subjects of Russia, NATO, and the transatlantic alliance, the AfD has increasingly aligned itself with the established parties and the political mainstream. The party’s once-criticized stances skeptical of NATO and pro-Russia have shifted toward the positions of Russia skepticism and pro-NATO sentiment that dominate German politics. Furthermore the AfD is increasingly aligning itself with the USA and its policies.
Isolated efforts to promote peace particularly regarding the war in Ukraine should not lead one to overlook the developments mentioned above. Indeed the party's growing base of supporters and voters creates an incentive for the AfD to shift further in this direction.

The AfD is increasingly abandoning its anti-imperialist and sovereignty-focused policies as it strives to position itself as a party capable of governing and forming coalitions. The notion of the AfD as a socially-oriented workers' party championing "solidaristic patriotism" (SolPat) is being dwarfed, as are criticisms of state intervention in the economy and commitments to economic liberalism, all are increasingly overshadowed by the party's new push for military rearmament and a shared ideology of fiscal discipline. Moreover by sacrificing its role as a rebellious opposition force in favor of becoming a viable coalition partner, the AfD is committing aesthetic suicide.
"We are the people" is transforming into "We are combat ready". The AfD once sought to save the country, yet it is increasingly becoming a vehicle for securing majorities that serve the interests of external lobbies and agendas.

The AfD is no longer what it claims to be and it does not do what it promises. However this contradiction is unlikely to harm the AfD’s strength which stems from the weakness of the other parties and public disillusionment. If the new US representatives in Europe go along in this game they could become the new transatlantic lobbies. But if the new US representatives in Europe believe that this relationship benefits their countries they are confusing US interests with their own.

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