[Rezension] Erich Vad - Ernstfall für Deutschland - Vorbereitung und Prävention
Dr. Erich Emmerich Hugo Vad is a retired Brigadier General of the German Armed Forces, a management consultant, author and university lecturer. During his military career, Vad studied history and earned his doctorate with a dissertation on the relevance of Clausewitz's military theory. In the German Armed Forces Vad served in the Army Reconnaissance Corps, was an advisor on security and defense policy to the German Bundestag in Berlin from 2000 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2013 as a group leader in the Federal Chancellery, Secretary of the Federal Security Council and military advisor to Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) in Berlin. In his 2024 book "Emergency for Germany - A Handbook Against War" he advocates for measures to prevent war in Europe and Germany.
Vad begins by describing a hypothetical scenario in which the war in Ukraine has spread to Germany. As a result significant damage has been inflicted in both Germany and Russia. Based on this scenario, Vad proposes measures for preparation and prevention.
The most Dangerous Cause of Action
Vad warns of war in Europe and Germany. This is particularly likely because Germany is a logistical hub in Europe and the government is taking ever greater risks. Vad outlines the following hypothetical scenario.
Im Kriege mehr als irgendwo sonst in der Welt. kommen die Dinge anders, als man sich es gedacht hat, und sehen in der Nähe anders aus als in der Entfernung.
In war, more than anywhere else in the world, things turn out differently than expected and look different up close than they do from a distance.
Carl von Clausewitz [1, p.9]
Germany is supplying Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine and is allowing itself to be drawn ever deeper into the war in Ukraine. As a result Germany and European NATO troops are being attacked with long-range weapons. Instead of invoking Article 5 of the NATO treaty the US declares its intention to focus on the Indoa-Pacific region (Pivot to Asia) but carries out retaliatory strikes from Germany. Mutual American and Russian retaliatory strikes thus perpetuate the destruction in Russia, Europe and especially in Germany. For Vad this development is a realistic consequence since Germany is neither preparing for nor preventing conflict through either peace or war policies. One reason for this is that Germany lacks an independent foreign policy apart from unconditional loyalty to the USA. [1, p.9-25]
Preparation and Prevention
For Vad Germany's strategic insignificance is self-inflicted. At the same time this strategic insignificance jeopardizes Germany's security. Vad therefore outlines various measures that are necessary to be prepared for the future.
Vermeintliche Allwissenheit gepaart mit Ignoranz ist nie ein guter Ratgeber.
Supposed omniscience coupled with stubbornness is never a good advisor. [1, p.26]
I. Recognizing the Problem: The (First) Train Has Left the Station
It should have been clear that Ukraine's long-sought NATO membership is a red line for Russia.
This is because Russia sees its access to the Black Sea via Crimea threatened and its own security threatened by troops and missiles in Ukraine.
Therefore Germany must not be indifferent to the interests of the other side neither in the past nor in the future.
Vad places great emphasis on understanding the other side without defending it and on the fact that understanding and defending something are not the same thing.
A war of attrition or even annihilation against Russia is in no one's interest.
[1, p.27-29]
II. Taking action: Germany is making itself smaller than it is
Vad explains that the need for a sovereign policy outweighs Germany's ambitions.
On the one hand the US focus is shifting and on the other hand Germany and the EU are unnecessarily diminishing their power and making themselves weak through opposing actions.
Germany can in any case rely on diplomacy with the other side and its partners.
This is particularly important for Germany to prevent the war in Ukraine from spreading to Germany and thus to ensure that Germany lives up to its weight in Europe.
[1, p.29-33]
III. Knowing what we want: Without a goal, there is no path to the goal
Vad describes how aimlessly politics is acting and how it lacks a plan for long-term goals.
He acknowledges that arms deliveries to Ukraine can be decided upon and carried out but notes that there is no plan beyond that.
While there is a willingness to supply Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine the consequences are being ignored.
There is no plan for a way out of the conflict or what a possible peace should look like.
[1, p.33-36]
Russland zu ächten mag moralisch richtig sein, kostet uns aber ebenfalls - und zeigt bisher weder die erhoffte durchschlagende Wirkung, noch bringt es Putin an den Verhandlungsstich.
Outlawing Russia may be morally right but it also costs us money - and so far has shown neither the hoped-for decisive effect nor does it bring Putin to the negotiating table. [1, p.35]
Wenn wir ans Ziel kommen wollen, dürfen isolierte Waffenlieferungen nicht unser zentrales, alles beherrschende politische Thema sein.
If we want to reach our goal, isolated arms deliveries must not be our central all-dominating political issue. [1, p.36]
Vad therefore accuses the German government of lacking a strategic plan and being not solution-oriented. Instead of developing a comprehensive strategy based on its own national interests Germany is behaving like a part of the USA and ignoring its own interests. [1, p.33-36]
Frieden bedeutet nicht, schnellstmöglich beste Freunde zu werden. Frieden ist lediglich die Abwesenheit von Krieg, und ohne Frieden wird auf Dauer niemand überleben.
Peace doesn't mean becoming best friends as quickly as possible. Peace is simply the absence of war and without peace no one will survive in the long run. [1, p.33]
IV. Standing up for oneself: Germany must (and may) also be its own next mate
Given its history it may be understandable for Germany to divide the world into good and evil, right and wrong.
And it may be understandable that Germany prefers to present itself as peaceful, friendly and relatively harmless.
However this can be detrimental to Germany.
[1, p.36-38]
Deutschland tritt geopolitisch nicht als ebenbürtiger Partner in Aktion. Wir nehmen keine strategisch führende Rolle in der EU oder NATO ein, obwohl wir es könnten. Von einer Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe mit unseren engsten Verbündeten, den USA, kann keine Rede sein.
Germany does not act as an equal partner in geopolitical matters. We do not assume a leading strategic role in the EU or NATO even though we could. There is no question of a partnership on equal terms with our closest allies the USA. [1, p.37]
V. Building deterrence, seeking understanding: How the German Armed Forces and politics secure peace
Vad explains that the need for national armed forces is not always predictable.
Consequently the armed forces must always be sufficiently combat-ready.
Vad describes how this security policy formerly linked Europe inextricably with North America.
However German security policy is now shaped by the interests of the USA as exemplified by the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Germany and the war in Ukraine.
This shift in Western orientation is described as a change from an alliance to a subservient mentality.
[1, p.38-43]
Durch die Kriegstüchtigkeit hat die damalige Bundeswehr maßgeblich dazu beigetragen, dass es nicht zum Krieg kam. Der Frieden wurde bewahrt, weil die einstige Bundesrepublik eine glaubwürdige Verteidigungsfähigkeit besaß. Das galt übrigens auch für die DDR und deren NVA - auch wenn der Auftrag naturgemäß ein anderer war.
The Bundeswehr's combat readiness played a crucial role in preventing war. Peace was preserved because the former Federal Republic of Germany possessed a credible defense capability. This also applied to the GDR and its National People's Army (NVA) – even though their mission was naturally different. [1, p.39]
Instead deterrence should be achieved through diplomacy and joint disarmament. Such diplomacy and joint disarmament secured the security of Europe on both sides during the Cold War and gave Germany and Western Europe a decisive role within NATO. Vad places particular emphasis on respecting the interests of the other side regardless of whether they are justified or not. These interests will not disappear due to a lack of understanding consequently they must be analyzed, evaluated and addressed. Germany's interests have changed and the relationship with the US no longer exclusively guarantees security but risks it. In this context the USA's expectations of Germany regarding Russia and China are incompatible with Germany's interests. For this reason as well Germany must emancipate itself from the US and its conflict with Russia and China. [1, p.38-43]
Wir haben uns in Sicherheit gewogen und darauf gesetzt, dass der Status quo der Welt und der Frieden erhalten bleiben. Doch Frieden und Sicherheit machen Arbeit. Der Krieg in der Ukraine zeigt, dass sich Deutschland nicht auf Waffenlieferungen beschränken kann.
We felt secure and assumed that the world status quo and peace would be maintained. But peace and security require effort. The war in Ukraine shows that Germany cannot simply rely on arms deliveries. [1, p.41]
VI. Be prepared: Federal prepping instead of fighting for survival
Vad also advocates for comprehensive civil defense by the state as well as the reintroduction of conscription.
On the one hand appropriate infrastructure for the protection of the civilian population must be built and upgraded.
Furthermore independence from imports and energy imports must be achieved to reduce vulnerability to price shocks and supply chain disruptions.
Vad considers the reintroduction of conscription necessary to reach the troop strength he is aiming for.
[1, p.43-45]
VII. Breaking free, emancipating ourselves, thinking for ourselves: The USA must not be our sole guiding star
Vad explains that the alliance with the US created security for Europe by increasing the commitment of both sides during the Cold War.
Therefore the relationship with the US is in the mutual interest, even if not on an equal footing.
However the interests represented by this alliance are now unilaterally those of the US.
But instead of questioning this Germany simply complies.
[1, p.45-52]
Inzwischen hat sich die Allianz zwischen Deutschland und den USA gewandelt, die Freundschaft ist einseitiger geworden. Wir machen nach, was und die Amerikaner vorturnen. Handeln, wie Washington es von uns erwartet. Ohne das es zwangsläufig in unserem Interesse ist.
The alliance between Germany and the USA has changed the friendship has become more one-sided. We're copying what the Americans are doing. Acting as Washington expects of us. Without it necessarily being in our interest. [1, p.46]
Vad cites the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Germany as an example. The purpose is to reach Russia from a country other than the US and in a shorter time. However in the event of a retaliatory strike Germany would be hit as a proxy for the US. To make matters worse this time the American missiles are only stationed in Germany and not across the large area of ??the NATO territory and Germany is already a staging area and logistical hub for NATO. Besides the risk to Germany this would complicate potential negotiations between Germany and Russia. [1, p.45-52]
Das amerikanische Engagement für die Ukraine dient vor allem dazu, Russland als strategische Rivalen der USA in die Schranken zu weisen.
The American involvement in Ukraine serves primarily to keep Russia in check as a strategic rival of the USA. [1, p.47]
Vad emphasizes the need for arms control in this context. Therefore Vad demands that the German government negotiate a renewal of the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) with the American government. The US withdrew from this 1987 treaty in 2019 after both sides accused each other of violating it. [1, p.45-52]
VIII. Taking on social responsibility: When demons prevent us from seeing clearly
Vad criticizes the quality of reporting and public debate particularly in connection with the war in Ukraine.
Specifically he criticizes how the other side its population and its soldiers are dehumanized and how much mainstream media outlets align themselves with the government.
Regardless of the legitimacy of a military intervention human individuals who are not soulless puppets of evil also die and suffer on that side.
[1, p.52-55]
Je schlimmer der Feind anmutet - zum Beispiel als blutrünstiges Monster oder dämonischer Nazi - und je katastrophaler die Folgen für das Land und Leben scheinen, umso eher sind die Bürger gewillt, auch hinter (Kriegs)Entscheidungen ihrer Regierung zu stellen.
The more terrifying the enemy appears – for example as a bloodthirsty monster or a demonic Nazi – and the more catastrophic the consequences for the country and life seem the more likely citizens are to support their government's (war) decisions. [1, p.53]
In this context the public may turn away from traditional news reporting and towards alternative media. This can be beneficial but it also carries the risk of the public believing the most blatant nonsense. [1, p.52-55]
Regierungsvertreter sind Repräsentanten der deutschen Bevölkerung, keine unabhängigen Herrscher.
Government representatives are representatives of the German population not independent rulers. [1, p.55]
[Review] Erich Vad - Emergency for Germany - The most Dangerous Cause of Action
[Review] Erich Vad - Emergency for Germany - The Transatlantic Dilemma 2026-04-22
[1] Erich Vad - Ernstfall für Deutschland : Ein Handbuch gegen den Krieg - ISBN 978-3-86489-492-3
[2] Erich Vad Consulting
https://erichvad-consulting.de/
[3] Leseprobe
https://westendverlag.de/media/34/63/da/1730736907/LESEPROBE_Vad_Ernstfall-fuer-Deutschand.pdf
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