[Rezension] Erich Vad - Ernstfall für Deutschland - Das transatlantische Dilemma
Dr. Erich Emmerich Hugo Vad is a retired Brigadier General of the German Armed Forces, a management consultant, author and university lecturer. During his military career, Vad studied history and earned his doctorate with a dissertation on the relevance of Clausewitz's military theory. In the German Armed Forces Vad served in the Army Reconnaissance Corps, was an advisor on security and defense policy to the German Bundestag in Berlin from 2000 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2013 as a group leader in the Federal Chancellery, Secretary of the Federal Security Council and military advisor to Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) in Berlin. In his 2024 book "Emergency for Germany - A Handbook Against War" he advocates for measures to prevent war in Europe and Germany.
Vad begins by describing a hypothetical scenario in which the war in Ukraine has spread to Germany. As a result significant damage has been inflicted in both Germany and Russia. Finally Vad explains the dilemma of the transatlantic alliance due to differing interests and within the context of a multipolar world order.
The most Dangerous Cause of Action
Vad warns of war in Europe and Germany. This is particularly likely because Germany is a logistical hub in Europe and the government is taking ever greater risks. Vad outlines the following hypothetical scenario.
Im Kriege mehr als irgendwo sonst in der Welt. kommen die Dinge anders, als man sich es gedacht hat, und sehen in der Nähe anders aus als in der Entfernung.
In war, more than anywhere else in the world, things turn out differently than expected and look different up close than they do from a distance.
Carl von Clausewitz [1, p.9]
Germany is supplying Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine and is allowing itself to be drawn ever deeper into the war in Ukraine. As a result Germany and European NATO troops are being attacked with long-range weapons. Instead of invoking Article 5 of the NATO treaty the US declares its intention to focus on the Indoa-Pacific region (Pivot to Asia) but carries out retaliatory strikes from Germany. Mutual American and Russian retaliatory strikes thus perpetuate the destruction in Russia, Europe and especially in Germany. For Vad this development is a realistic consequence since Germany is neither preparing for nor preventing conflict through either peace or war policies. One reason for this is that Germany lacks an independent foreign policy apart from unconditional loyalty to the USA. [1, p.9-25]
The Transatlantic Dilemma
According to Vad, Germany's relationship with the USA its relations with Russia and China and how much Germany does for its own security are all determined by its relationship with the US. But Germany needs good relations with Russia and China and relies too heavily on the USA and NATO. Therefore Germany's relationship with the USA determines whether Germany has any say in the world. Furthermore Germany's interests are not those of the US. In fact there is a danger that Germany will allow itself to be drawn further and further into the war in Ukraine by the US. [1, p.57-58]
Solange ein Volk in der Sphäre des Politischen existiert, muss es, wenn auch nur für den extremsten Fall - über dessen Vorliegen es aber selbst entscheidet -, die Unterscheidung von Freund und Feind selber bestimmen. Darin liegt das Wesen seiner politischen Existenz. [...] Lässt es sich von einem Fremden vorschreiben, wer sein Freund ist und gegen wen es kämpfen darf oder nicht, so ist es kein politisches Volk mehr und einem anderen politischen Systemen ein- oder untergeordnet.
As long as a people exists in the political sphere it must even if only in the most extreme case—the existence of which it itself decides—determine the distinction between friend and enemy. Therein lies the essence of its political existence. [...] If it allows a stranger to dictate who its friend is and against whom it may or may not fight it is no longer a political people and is subordinate to another political system.
Carl Schmitt [1, p.58]
Although this was the case in the past the Western alliance with the US and NATO would no longer guarantee security. On the one hand the US no longer has Germany's best interests at heart which however is legitimate for the US. On the other hand NATO is primarily the strategic bridgehead of the US in western Eurasia. Vad illustrates this with the wars in Serbia (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Syria (2011), Libya (2011) and the Ukraine war which Vad describes as a proxy war and how these were waged at the behest of and in the interest of the US. Furthermore these wars have left behind veritable disasters in the form of refugee flows and reduced security. Vad explains the US's recklessness in this foreign policy by pointing out that they themselves are less affected by its consequences and dangers. At the same time the US is increasingly withdrawing from the Ukraine war and transferring more and more responsibility to the US. [1, p.58-63]
Wir müssen erkennen, dass erstens die USA nicht unser sondern ihr Bestes wollen - was in Übrigen völlig legitim ist. Und zweitens, dass die NATO nicht (mehr) das Verteidigungsbündnis ist, das den Westen jahrzehntelang zusammengeschweißt hat. Tatsächlich war und ist die NATO vor allem der strategische Brückenkopf der USA im Westen Eurasiens.
We must recognize that firstly the US doesn't want what's best for us, but for itself – which incidentally is perfectly legitimate. And secondly that NATO is no longer the defense alliance that united the West for decades. In fact NATO was and is primarily the strategic bridgehead of the USA in western Eurasia. [1, p.58]
Auch der Ukraine Krieg, der wie erwähnt auch ein Stellvertreterkrieg zwischen den USA und Russland ist, spielt sich weit weg von den amerikanischen Grenzen ab. Das Risiko, dass er zu einem großen europäischen Krieg, gar zu einem Nuklearkrieg auf europäischen Boden eskaliert, gefährdet die USA nicht unmittelbar. Aus amerikanischer Sicht erscheint der Ukraine-Krieg vielmehr eine Möglichkeit, den Kontrahenten Russland massiv zu schädigen und die Europäer gleichzeitig stärker an die sicherheitspolitischen Kandare der amerikanischen machtpolitischen Ziele zu nehmen: Die wirklichen wichtigen Entscheidungen zum westlichen Umgang mit dem Ukraine-Krieg werden in Washington getroffen.
The war in Ukraine which, as mentioned, is also a proxy war between the US and Russia is taking place far from American borders. The risk of it escalating into a major European war, or even a nuclear war on European soil, does not pose an immediate threat to the USA. From an American perspective the war in Ukraine appears to be an opportunity to inflict massive damage on its adversary Russia, while simultaneously bringing the Europeans more firmly under the security policy control of American power politics: The truly important decisions regarding the Western approach to the war in Ukraine are being made in Washington. [1, p.60]
For Vad it is therefore clear that this situation must change between Germany and the USA and that Germany must emancipate itself.
Vad outlines three scenarios.
I
Germany could continue to play a vassal role and remain allied with the US.
However in that case Germany would lack a geopolitical strategy, power, or national ambitions and would be importing security from the US at a high risk.
II
Germany could simply break away from the USA.
However Germany would then risk ceding Eurasia to Russia and China and falling under their influence in the long term.
III
Vad therefore recommends that Germany take control of its own security policy destiny.
To achieve this Germany within the EU, must simultaneously have strategic autonomy between the US and Russia as well as between China and the US.
China could offer a way to extricate itself from the conflict between the US and Russia especially given the threat of further proxy wars in the Caucasus and the Balkans.
At the same time however Germany must not allow itself to be co-opted by China.
[1, p.63-67]
Und die USA werden in einigen Jahren voraussichtlich nicht mehr die unangefochtene Nummer Eins in der Welt sein. Ihre Vormachtstellung wird an zu vielen Fronten - ökonomisch, politisch und militärisch - gleichzeitig angegriffen, als dass sie sie überall mit der gleichen Stärke und Konsequenz verteidigen könnten.
And in a few years the US will likely no longer be the undisputed number one in the world. Its dominance is being attacked on too many fronts simultaneously—economic political and military—for it to be able to defend it everywhere with the same strength and consistency. [1, p.30]
Weil es also auch um Deutschland - wie überhaupt um Europa - geht, darf die deutsche Politik die eigenen nationalen Interessen nicht einfach ausklammern. Stattdessen muss sie endlich eine umfassende Strategie für Deutschland finden, die sich an unseren nationalen Interessen orientiert und über den Krieg in der Ukraine hinausreicht, selbst wenn er eines unserer dringendsten Probleme ist.
Because this also concerns Germany — and indeed Europe — German politics cannot simply ignore its own national interests. Instead it must finally find a comprehensive strategy for Germany that is oriented toward our national interests and extends beyond the war in Ukraine even though it is one of our most pressing problems. [1, p.35]
Vad describes the habit of dividing the world into good and evil or good democrats and evil autocrats as a mistake of the Western world. Instead the USA divides the world into strategically important regions. This American exceptionalism however needs to be defused in order to allow the West to transition into the new multipolar world order. The USA is fading as a world power and with its sense of entitlement is jeopardizing the establishment of a new peace order. [1, p.68-71
In Zukunft wird es außen- und sicherheitspolitisch vor allem darum gehen müssen, einen möglichst friedlichen Abstieg der USA aus ihrer weltweiten Vormachtstellung - sie sehen auch als >>second to none<< (>>unübertroffen<<) - zu managen, den amerikanischen Exzeptionalismus zu entschärfen und dazu beizutragen, dem Westen, mit den USA, in die neue Multipolarität und Differenzhiertheit der Welt zu integrieren.
In the future foreign and security policy will primarily have to focus on managing the most peaceful possible decline of the USA from its global hegemony – which it also sees as >>second to none<< (>>unrivaled<<) – to defuse American exceptionalism and to contribute to integrating the West with the USA into the new multipolarity and differentiation of the world. [1, p.68]
Krieg darf kein Kollateralschaden von Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sein.
Deswegen verbiete sich blinde Bündnistreue mit den USA und gebieten sich gute Beziehungen zu Russland, China und den BRICS-Staaten beziehungsweise dem globalen Süden.
War must not be collateral damage of foreign and security policy.
Therefore blind loyalty to the US is unacceptable and good relations with Russia, China and the BRICS countries or rather the Global South are essential.
[1, p.72-75]
Es gibt keinen rationalen Zweck, keine noch so richtige Norm, kein noch so vorbildliches Programm, kein noch so schönes soziales Ideal, keine Legitimität oder Legalität, die es rechtfertigen könnte, dass Menschen sich gegenseitig dafür töten.
There is no rational purpose no matter how correct the norm, no matter how exemplary the program no matter how beautiful the social ideal no legitimacy or legality that could justify people killing each other for it.
Carl Schmitt [1, p.77]
[Review] Erich Vad - Emergency for Germany - The most Dangerous Cause of Action
[Review] Erich Vad - Emergency for Germany - Preparation and Prevention
[1] Erich Vad - Ernstfall für Deutschland : Ein Handbuch gegen den Krieg - ISBN 978-3-86489-492-3
[2] Erich Vad Consulting
https://erichvad-consulting.de/
[3] Leseprobe
https://westendverlag.de/media/34/63/da/1730736907/LESEPROBE_Vad_Ernstfall-fuer-Deutschand.pdf
Kommentare
Kommentar veröffentlichen